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COCKPIT TECHNOLOGY AND WEATHER RELATED DECISION MAKING:
AN INTEGRATIVE REVIEW
Johnson, N.R., Wiegmann, D.A., Goh, J. and Wickens, C.D.
Aviation Human Factors Division, Institute of Aviation
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Savoy, IL
This paper provides a synthesis of the empirical studies to date that have investigated weather-related pilot decision
making. Of particular interest is how new cockpit technologies such as synthetic vision systems and graphical
weather information systems interact with flight experience, risk perception, risk-taking tendencies and selfconfidence in affecting pilots’ decision to continue flight into adverse weather. A conceptual framework for
integrating and interpreting the results of these various studies is also be proposed.
Introduction
Visual flight rules (VFR) flight into instrument
meteorological conditions (IMC), or unqualified
flight into adverse weather, continues to be a major
safety hazard within general aviation (GA). In an
analysis of GA accidents between 1990 and 1997,
Goh and Wiegmann (2002) found that the fatality
rate of VFR into IMC accidents was approximately
80%. This compared to a fatality rate of
approximately 19% for other types of GA accidents
during the same period. These statistics reflect
similar trends found by the National Transportation
Safety Board (1989) for United States GA accidents
that occurred during the 1970s and mid-1980s, as
well as GA accident trends in other countries (e.g.,
United Kingdom and New Zealand; O’Hare &
Smitheram, 1995). In a recent analysis, Knecht,
Harris and Shappell (2004) found that the GA fatality
rate per million passenger miles was 223 times that of
commercial aviation for the period 1990-1998. In
addition, the authors’ analysis revealed that IMC was
implicated in 32% of these GA fatalities. In sum,
these findings clearly indicate that VFR flight into
IMC continues to be a major safety hazard within
general aviation.
Visual flight rules flight into IMC is often
characterized by pilots’ decisions to continue a flight
into adverse weather conditions, despite having been
given information or presented with cues that indicate
they should do otherwise (NTSB, 1989). One
possible explanation for VFR flight into IMC is
based on the predictions made by prospect theory
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1982). The hypothesis put
forward by O’Hare and Smitheram (1995) and
O’Hare and Owen (1999), predicts that pilots framing
the decision to continue flight into deteriorating
weather in terms of losses (e.g. loss of time, money,
effort) will be risk-seeking and continue with the
flight. Conversely, those pilots who frame the
decision in terms of gains (e.g. personal safety) will

be risk-averse and divert the flight when faced with
deteriorating weather. This hypothesis was supported
by analysis of GA accidents in New Zealand over the
period 1988 to 2000 (Owen, O’Hare and Wiegmann,
2001). The authors’ found that weather-related
accidents occurred significantly farther from the
departure point than other types of accidents (loss of
control, collision with terrain and mechanical
failure). Efforts to demonstrate a similar pattern in
laboratory studies have been unsuccessful however.
There is a growing body of evidence that errors in
situation assessment may lead to pilots’ decisions to
continue flight into deteriorating weather. Goh and
Wiegmann (2001) and Wiegmann, Goh and O’Hare
(2002) found that VFR pilots who continued
simulated flights into adverse weather generally
misinterpreted weather information, overestimating
weather parameters. That is, pilots who continued
flight had more positive views of cloud ceiling and
visibility than those pilots who did not continue the
flight. Pilots involved in VFR into IMC accidents
also generally have less experience diagnosing and
flying in adverse weather (Goh & Wiegmann, 2002).
Burian, Orasanu & Hitt (2000) found that pilots in
their study who were in the 25th percentile and below
in terms of total flight hours were more likely to
press on into deteriorating weather than those in the
75th percentile and above. The authors suggested that
some pilots, particularly those with less experience,
“do not trust what their eyes are telling them and so
proceed on blindly”(p. 25). Therefore, at least in
some situations, VFR flight into IMC can be viewed
as a failure in recognition-primed decision making
(RPD; Klein, 1993). Consequently, training and
technological inventions that focus on improving
pilots’ situation awareness (SA) and weather
evaluation might improve pilot decision making,
thereby reducing accidents due to VFR flight
into IMC.
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Contrary to the above evidence, however, are
findings indicating that some pilots occasionally
choose to continue flight into adverse weather even
after they have become aware of the hazardous
conditions (Burian, Orasanu & Hitt, 2000). Pilots
who continue flight into adverse weather tend to be
overconfident in their abilities and also underestimate
the risks of VFR flight into IMC (O’Hare, 1990).
Indeed, results from the Goh and Wiegmann (2001)
study partially support this hypothesis in that pilots
who chose to continue a simulated flight into
adverse weather were more confident in their
skills compared to those who chose to divert and
generally underestimated the risks of crashing due to
the weather.
Some researchers have found that prior exposure to
adverse weather improves pilots’ situation
assessment abilities (Wiggins & O’Hare, 1995;
O’Hare, Owen & Wiegmann, 2001) but also reduces
their perceptions of risk. In a simulator study
involving a 180° turn out of IMC, Goh and
Wiegmann (2004) found that pilots who flew the turn
in a low-turbulence condition had reduced
perceptions of risk compared to pilots who flew in a
high-turbulence condition. In subsequent encounters
with adverse weather, those pilots with reduced risk
perception may be more willing to fly into
deteriorating weather or enter into flight conditions
that exceed their abilities.
Novacek, Burgess, Heck and Stokes (2001) found
that pilots who possessed more extreme risk-taking
personalities were also more likely to make
riskier/poorer weather-related decisions when using a
NEXRAD display than those pilots who were
generally risk averse. Collectively, these findings
suggest that efforts to improve pilots’ weather related
decision making should not only address situation
awareness and assessment but also the potential
impact of such efforts on risk-taking behavior.
Unfortunately, only a few empirical studies to date
have been conducted to examine the impact that
different types of technology aboard aircraft have on
GA pilots’ decisions to continue VFR flight into
IMC. In one such study, O’Hare, Owen and
Wiegmann (2001) investigated GA pilots’ use of a
global positioning system (GPS) during a crosscountry flight in deteriorating weather conditions.
The authors found that pilots flying an airplane
equipped with a global positioning system (GPS)
were more accurate in their position assessments and
had a greater confidence in their location than pilots
who flew without GPS equipment. In addition, the
pilots with GPS were more likely to continue flight

into IMC or remain airborne longer than pilots
without GPS. The results of the study also showed
that pilots who continued flight into IMC had lower
estimates of the risks involved, compared to pilots
who diverted, corroborating the previous findings of
Goh and Wiegmann (2001).
In another study, Beringer and Ball (2003)
investigated how variations in the data resolution of
an on-board graphical weather information system
(GWIS) affected pilots’ judgment of weather severity
and decisions to continue a simulated cross-country
flight. The GWIS used NEXRAD (NEXt-generationRADar) data to give pilots graphical information on
the location and intensity of local area precipitation.
The NEXRAD data was presented in 8km, 4km or
2km resolutions. The authors found that pilots with
the highest resolution NEXRAD display (2km) spent
the most time looking at the GWIS display, delayed
their decision to divert the longest and came closest
to the thunderstorm cells compared to the other two
lower-resolution pilot groups. Based on these results
and further data from post-flight static image
judgments, the authors suggested that the highresolution NEXRAD displays are likely to encourage
pilots to continue flight while attempting to maneuver
around or between the significant weather cells.
These findings suggest that as weather and other
navigation displays become more advanced and
sophisticated they may shift pilots’ decision making
processes from that of strategic decision making to
that of tactical decision making. A pilot using such a
display strategically may attempt to avoid a hazard
altogether, whereas a pilot using a display tactically
may attempt to negotiate a path through a weather
hazard area such as a broken line of thunderstorms.
In general, the distinction between the two types of
decision making is that tactical decision making will
be reactive to immediate environmental events while
strategic decision making will be proactive and
include planned avoidance of potentially hazardous
events (Latorella and Chamberlain, 2002). Such
shifts in decision strategies could have severe
negative ramifications for generally less-skilled
GA pilots.
A particular advance in cockpit technology that could
affect these GA pilots in the near future is the
synthetic vision system (SVS). SVS displays provide
the pilot with an ego-centric, synthetic realization of
terrain and other potential hazards (for example,
traffic or towers) in front of the aircraft to better
support flight in challenging terrain or low visibility
conditions. Typically, the SVS display will include
flight path guidance in the form of a highway in the
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sky (HITS; Alexandra, Wickens and Hardy, 2003;
Williams, 2002; Berringer, 2000). It is hoped that
synthetic vision technology will help prevent
controlled flight into terrain (CFIT) and low-visibility
loss of control (LVLOC) GA accidents.
Takallu, Wong and Uenking (2002) examined the use
of SVS technology to help counter LVLOC
accidents. In their flight simulation study, noninstrument rated GA pilots were required to execute
basic flight maneuvers after entering into IMC. The
maneuvers (180° turn, straight climb, straight
descent, straight and level flight) were performed
with either standard instruments or a SVS display
(without HITS). The authors found that pilots flying
with the SVS generally committed fewer violations
of the altitude, heading or airspeed tolerances that
were specified prior to the flight maneuvers. The
improved performance of pilots while using the SVS
display was attributed to enhanced spatial awareness
that the display afforded.
To the best of our knowledge, there have been no
further studies that investigate VFR pilots’ use of
SVS displays while encountering deteriorating
weather. There is however, the opportunity to
examine issues with SVS technology that may be
relevant to weather related decision making that have
been raised in a number of different studies.
Although it has commonly been found that a HITS
SVS display supports flight path tracking (e.g., Iani
& Wickens, 2004; Prinzel, Comstock, Glabb,
Kramer, Arther & Barry, 2004) there is evidence that
there may be performance trade-offs. For example,
the clutter associated with over-laying traffic
information, traditional aircraft instrumentation and
the HITS may inhibit traffic detection, in particular
traffic that is neither expected or salient (Wickens,
Ververs
and Faden, 2004). In addition, the
compelling nature of the HITS SVS may cause pilots
to shift a disproportionate amount of visual attention
to the SVS display, or at least make it more difficult
to switch attention away from the SVS display to
perform a concurrent task.
While not specifically looking at an SVS display,
Wickens , Goh, Helleberg, Horrey and Talleur (2003)
found that a cockpit display of traffic information
(CDTI) affected pilot detection of a “rouge” aircraft
that was only visible in the outside world. By
drawing pilot attention away from the outside world,
the CDTI made it more difficult for pilots to detect
the rouge aircraft.
In contrast to the hypothesis that a HITS SVS display
may be so compelling as to reduce outside-world

scanning performance, is the hypothesis that such a
display may lead to an increase in concurrent task
performance by alleviating the workload associated
with the primary flight control task. This hypothesis
is supported by the finding that pilots flying with a
HITS SVS display were more sensitive to weather
changes presented in a secondary cockpit display
than pilots without the HITS (Iani and Wickens,
2004). For integration with the issues raised in this
paper, it should be noted that weather-event detection
occurred from the in-cockpit display and not from
any visual cues in the outside world (pilots were
flying in IMC).
The manner in which scanning mediates the
relationship between display and performance also
needs to be considered. While Wickens et al. (2003)
found a coupling between reduced outside world
scanning and poorer performance in traffic detection,
the relationship is not always consistent. Williams
(2002) for example, found that despite the fact that
the time pilots spent scanning the outside world
decreased with a HITS SVS, their ability to detect
outside world traffic was not reduced significantly.
The above studies, while not directly addressing
VFR flight into IMC, highlight some general issues
with pilot use of synthetic vision systems that are
worth considering in a weather related decision
making context. If pilots’ scanning behavior is
altered by the new technology, resulting in less time
spent looking outside the cockpit, it is reasonable to
expect that pilots’ weather situation assessment may
become poorer. Also, if the HITS appears to present
the pilot with enough flight path information to
navigate without reference to the outside world, it
may encourage certain pilots to fly into deteriorating
weather believing they can use the technology
exclusively. On the other hand, if pilot flight control
workload is reduced with the HITS SVS display, it is
reasonable to expect that weather-related decision
making may improve as more mental resources are
available to integrate the in-cockpit weather
information and the outside world weather cues.
The specific parameters of advanced displays that
impact pilot-decision making, however, have yet to
be systematically identified. Hence, little is known
about how to design displays to achieve their desire
effect (e.g., improved weather evaluation) while also
minimizing any detrimental impact they have on
decision making (i.e., induced risk taking). It should
be noted, however, that the impact that advanced
cockpit displays have on decision making and risktaking behavior is likely to be affected by individual
differences in pilot personalities and experiences. As
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stated previously, flight experience (including overall
flight time, cross country flying, and recency), selfconfidence, and risk-taking tendencies can all
influence pilots’ weather-related decision making
(Goh & Wiegmann, 2002). Hence, more research is
needed to examine the impact that advanced displays
have on decision making in the GA cockpit, while
also considering individual differences in pilots’
experiences and risk-taking tendencies.
Conceptual Framework
In order to help guide further research and integrate
the various issues affecting weather-related pilot
decision making, a conceptual framework is
presented in Figure 1. When encountering adverse
weather in flight, a number of factors can influence a
pilot’s decision to continue flight into the
deteriorating conditions. The preconditions that may
affect decision making include pre-flight planning
procedures and pilot characteristics such as
confidence in their ability and risk taking tendencies.
Inadvertent flight into IMC can be facilitated by
pilots’ poor situation assessment or in-flight planning
or by distraction. Intentional flight into IMC could be
seen as a result of pilots’ low risk perception,
personal motivation or perhaps social pressures. After
entering into IMC, pilots typically have little time
before the effects of spatial disorientation can
produce catastrophic consequences.
Both technology-centered and human-centered
interventions have the potential to affect pilots’
weather related decision making at different stages in
this model. GWIS displays for example, afford
improved situation awareness and give the pilot
another resource for in-flight planning. However, the
use of this technology must also be considered in
conjunction with pilots’ self-confidence in their
abilities, tendencies for risk-taking and perceptions of
risk. Consequently, human-centered interventions
like risk-management training need to be considered
in helping reduce incidences of VFR flight into MC.
In addressing the issue of spatial disorientation, SVS
displays could provide an intuitive tool for pilots to
remain spatially orientated and avoid LVLOC
accidents after entering IMC. However, effective
training would need to be in place to help ensure the
technology is used for its intended purpose (assisting
in executing a 180° turn out of IMC) rather than as a
means to support continued flight into conditions the
pilot is not trained or qualified to fly in.

Ongoing Research
A study is currently in progress at the University of
Illinois that examines how GWIS and SVS displays
affect pilots’ weather-related decision making. Of
specific interest is how the particular properties of
these two technological interventions (e.g. SVS
display with and without HITS) influence pilots’
decisions to continue simulated flight into
deteriorating weather. In addition, the interaction of
pilot personality factors with the technology will be
examined. The results of the study will have
implications for the design of displays for improving
weather-related decision making while also
minimizing risk-taking behavior.
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Figure 1. Conceptual framework for integrating issues relevant to pilots’ weather related decision making.
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